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Energy labels have been introduced in many countries to increase consumers’
attention to energy use in purchase decisions of durables. In a discrete-choice ex-
periment among about 5,000 households, we implement randomized information
treatments to explore the effects of various kinds of energy labels on purchasing de-
cisions. Our results show that adding annual operating cost information to the EU
energy label promotes the choice of energy-efficient durables. In addition, we find
that a majority of participants value efficiency classes beyond the economic value
of the underlying energy use differences. Our results further indicate that display-
ing operating cost affects choices through two distinct channels: it increases the
attention to operating cost and reduces the valuation of efficiency class differences.
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1. Introduction
Research from behavioral economics has demonstrated that consumers are attentive to salient
attributes of products, while neglecting those that are opaque, such as sales taxes (Chetty et al.,
2009) or shipping cost (Hossain and Morgan, 2006). With respect to the purchase of energy-
using durables, consumers tend to pay less attention to opaque lifetime energy cost than to
salient purchasing prices (e.g. Allcott and Taubinsky, 2015). By decreasing the perceived value
of energy efficiency, inattention to energy cost may explain the low tendency of consumers
to invest in cost-effective efficiency technologies (e.g. Allcott, 2011) – a phenomenon that is
commonly referred to as the “energy efficiency gap” (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994).
To bridge this gap, energy labels on electric appliances have been introduced all around
the world. Some of them, such as the EU energy label, categorize appliances into grade-like
efficiency classes. As these classes summarize energy information in an intuitive way, con-
sumers may use them to evaluate the energy efficiency of an appliance, while neglecting more
precise information on annual energy use. Evidence from both the laboratory (e.g. Gilovich
et al., 2002) and from market settings (e.g. Lacetera et al., 2012) has demonstrated that con-
sumers tend to employ such decision heuristics, i.e. simplifying decision rules, in the end
making choices that deviate from the benchmark of rational decision making. For example,
Pope (2009) finds that hospital ranking positions affect patient choices, even though more pre-
cise information on hospital quality is observable.
This paper analyzes the potential of energy labels with efficiency classes – such as the EU
label – to influence consumer choices. We propose a conceptual model of energy efficiency in-
vestment decisions that explicitly takes into account that consumers may be inattentive to op-
erating cost and apply decision heuristics based on energy efficiency classes. In our empirical
analysis, we first investigate whether households have a willingness-to-pay for efficiency class
differences per se, i.e. irrespective of energy use differences, as one would expect if consumers
used efficiency classes for heuristic thinking. Second, we analyze how appliance choices are
affected by an increase in the salience of annual operating cost, as well as the number of stimuli
that compete for attention. Third, we investigate the channels through which changes in the
salience of operating cost and the number of competing stimuli operate.
We conduct a discrete-choice experiment among 5,000 households that is framed as a pur-
chasing decision on refrigerators and assign participants randomly into three groups. Partic-
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ipants in a control condition receive information on the appliances based on a simplified EU
label that only displays the annual energy use and efficiency classes. In the first treatment
condition, the label additionally presents estimated annual operating cost, thereby increasing
the salience of this cost component. In the second treatment condition, participants see further
non-energy related appliance characteristics that act as additional stimuli competing for atten-
tion. All participants make decisions on four choice sets. Two of them reflect typical choice
situations in the market for refrigerators, encompassing common trade-offs between invest-
ment cost and operating cost. The remaining two choice sets serve to isolate the valuation of
efficiency classes and to investigate the channels through which the information treatments
work.
Previous research has focused on energy labels that do not include efficiency classes, such as
the US EnergyGuide. Newell and Siikama¨ki (2014), for instance, find evidence that consumers
undervalue energy efficiency in the absence of label information. Furthermore, they show
that the provision of annual electricity costs on the EnergyGuide label is particularly effective
in increasing the willingness-to-pay for energy efficiency. Analyzing the voluntary Energy
Star label in the US, Houde (2014a) concludes that some consumers rely predominantly on
the Energy Star certification and some rely on electricity cost information, while the majority
does not consider energy information at all. Furthermore, Houde (2014b) shows that firms
respond strategically to the Energy Star by designing products that barely meet the certification
requirement.
Our results demonstrate that additional cost information on the EU energy label guides con-
sumers to more energy-efficient appliances in choice situations that involve typical market
trade-offs between purchasing prices and energy efficiency, while an increase in the number
of stimuli competing for attention can have the opposite effect. Furthermore, we observe that
consumers value efficiency class differences per se: even in a setting where energy use differ-
ences are marginal, two thirds of consumers are willing to pay at least 30 EUR for a better
efficiency class. Moreover, we find that adding information on operating cost to the EU en-
ergy label works through two distinct channels: it increases attention to operating cost and
decreases the valuation of efficiency class differences.
Hypothetical rather than market choices are commonly analyzed to investigate alternative
label schemes (see e.g. Newell and Siikama¨ki, 2014). A potential shortcoming of this approach
is that its stylized decision environment may induce participants to focus more strongly on
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the energy label, compared to real-world settings. However, while the hypothetical nature of
choices may increase the overall rate of opting for a more energy-efficient appliance, it is less
clear why the size of treatment effects should be affected. Ebeling and Lotz (2015), for instance,
find that even though individuals choose “green” electricity tariffs more often in hypothetical
than in market settings, the treatment effects of tariff defaults are indistinguishable for both
approaches. What is more, hypothetical choices are central to our research design as they
enable us to construct stylized choice sets and to modify energy labels. By allowing for a proper
identification strategy that would be infeasible in real-world settings, they are a precondition
for disentangling the behavioral mechanisms that underlie consumers’ choices.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the following section, we introduce the EU energy la-
bel and the market for refrigerators. In Section 3, we present the conceptual model and our
hypotheses. Section 4 describes the experimental design and Section 5 presents the data. In
Section 6, we discuss the results. Section 7 concludes.
2. EU Energy Label and the Market for Refrigerators
Retailers have to display the EU energy label whenever household appliances are offered for
sale in the EU. Our analysis focuses on refrigerators, as their penetration rate reaches nearly
100% in almost all EU member states (Bertoldi et al., 2012) and their energy use is largely
independent of usage patterns. As visualized in Figure 1, the label for refrigerators depicts the
annual electricity use, an energy efficiency class ranging from D (least efficient) to A+++ (most
efficient), and information on the capacity of fresh food and frozen food compartments, as well
as the noise level. Due to the imposition of minimum standards (EU Directive 2009/125/EC),
refrigerators that are less efficient than class A+ are banned from the EU market since July
2012.
To assign efficiency classes to refrigerators, EU legislation prescribes the calculation of an
energy efficiency index (EEI) that accounts for the energy use of the appliance, its product
class, and its size.1 By construction, lower EEI values are associated with higher energy effi-
ciency. The efficiency class of an appliance is determined based on whether its EEI falls below
predefined cutoff values and is not a source of genuinely new information to buyers.
To investigate the distribution of energy efficiency in the market for refrigerators, we cal-
1Details on the calculation rule are given in EU Directive 2010/30/EU.
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Figure 1: EU Energy Label for Refrigerators
Figure 2: Energy Efficiency of Refrigerators on the Market
Note: Three appliances exceed the current EEI cutoff value for A+ appliances. Since they were already on the
market prior to July 2014, when the respective cutoff value was reduced from 44 to 42, they benefit from an
exceptional rule.
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culate the EEI for appliances offered in online stores of two large German retailers.2 Figure 2
visualizes that the relative frequencies of the EEI bunch strongly below the values of 42, 33 and
22, which are the cutoff values that determine the respective efficiency classes. Apparently, the
energy efficiency of refrigerators does not vary continuously, but in increments that allow to
reach a better efficiency class.
The evidence of bunching below the cutoff values indicates that producers of refrigerators
respond strategically to the existence of efficiency classes. This finding is in line with evidence
from the voluntary US Energy Star label (see Houde, 2014b) and strongly suggests that produc-
ers consider efficiency classes to be an important driver of consumers’ purchasing decisions.
Since investigating the valuation of efficiency classes from the consumers’ point of view is cen-
tral to our paper, we explicitly consider efficiency classes when developing a conceptual model
of energy efficiency investments in the following section.
3. Conceptual Model and Hypotheses
In this section, we develop a conceptual model that is based on Gerarden et al.’s (2015)
framework on technology adoption decisions. Consider the choice between two energy-
consuming durables A and B that are equal in any quality dimension, but differ in their pur-
chasing price and energy use. Cost-minimizing consumers calculate the present value of cost
(PVC) for each alternative j ∈ {A, B}:
PVCj = Kj + O(Ej, P)× D(r, T) + C,
where Kj represents the purchasing price of alternative j, O(Ej, P) denotes annual operating
costs that depend on the energy use Ej and the energy price P, both assumed to be constant
over time for the sake of simplicity. D(r, T) stands for a discount factor that depends on the
consumer’s discount rate r and the expected lifetime T of the appliance, while C denotes any
further costs that are assumed to be invariant across alternatives.
To fix ideas, let A denote the more energy efficient alternative with a higher purchasing
price but lower annual operating cost. Given cost-minimizing behavior, consumers choose the
2The underlying data for this analysis stems from product data sheets of the retailers Media Markt
(www.mediamarkt.de) and Saturn (www.saturn.de). Because refrigerators with small to medium cooling and
freezer compartment sizes form a particularly homogeneous appliance class and represent a considerable mar-
ket share of 20%, we focus on this product class. We consider all 109 refrigerator models that were offered in at
least one of the online stores in July 2015.
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energy efficient alternative A if its PVC is smaller than the PVC of alternative B:
PVCA − PVCB = ∆K + ∆PVO < 0, (1)
where ∆K corresponds to the difference in purchasing prices and ∆PVO denotes the difference
in the present values of operating cost between alternative A and B: ∆PVO := ∆O(EA, EB, P)×
D(r, T). Empirical investigations of the energy efficiency gap (e.g. Allcott and Wozny, 2014,
and Hausman, 1979) typically use such a cost-minimizing decision rule as a benchmark and
find that consumers tend to underinvest in energy efficiency. In our case, this would imply
that alternative B is chosen even though Inequality (1) suggests otherwise.
Investments into energy-using durables involve a trade-off between easily observable pur-
chasing prices and the present values of operating cost, which are based on beliefs over energy
prices, the lifespan of the appliance and individual time preferences and, hence, can be clas-
sified as an “opaque value component” (DellaVigna, 2009). Research in behavioral economics
has demonstrated that consumers tend to be inattentive to such opaque value components
(Chetty et al., 2009, Hossain and Morgan, 2006), deciding based on the difference between
perceived present values of cost (PPVC):
∆PPVC = ∆K + θ(S, N)∆PVO,
where∆PPVC corresponds to the difference between the PPVCs of both alternatives, PPVCA−
PPVCB, and θ(S, N) is an attention parameter that captures the degree to which the opaque
component, ∆PVO, is considered in the decision making process. We follow DellaVigna (2009)
by assuming θ to be a function of the salience S of the present value of operating cost and
the number N of stimuli that compete for attention. Under some degree of inattention, i.e.
0 ≤ θ(S, N) < 1, operating cost are only partly considered, which offers an explanation for
why a cost-effective investment into the energy-efficient alternative A may not be realized.
Some labels, such as the EU energy label, present grade-like efficiency classes. Although
such classes only summarize readily available information on annual energy use, they may
influence decision making. Most notably, the display of efficiency classes may induce con-
sumers to adopt simplifying decision rules that treat efficiency classes as the only source of
energy information, neglecting the more detailed information on energy use. An implication
of decision making based on such heuristics is that consumers express a willingness-to-pay for
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energy class differences per se, irrespective of energy use differences between appliances.
Taking heuristic thinking into account, consumers’ evaluation of the alternatives is based
on:
∆PPVC = ∆K + θ(S, N)∆PVO + τ(S, N)∆EC, (2)
where ∆EC denotes the difference in efficiency classes between alternative A and B and τ(S, N)
reflects the valuation of this difference. As participants may substitute operating cost for effi-
ciency class information in the decision-making process (and vice versa), variables that influ-
ence the attention to operating cost may simultaneously affect the valuation of efficiency class
differences. Accordingly, we specify τ(S, N) as a function of the salience of the present value
of operating cost S and the number of stimuli N that compete for attention.
Building on Equation (2), we hypothesize that an increase in the salience of operating cost
raises the difference in perceived present values of cost (∆PPVC) and thus the probability to
choose the more energy-efficient appliance (PA), so that ∂PA/∂S > 0 (cost hypothesis).3 Second,
we anticipate that an increase in the number of competing stimuli N in the form of further
product characteristics that are unrelated to energy use decreases ∆PPVC and leads to less
frequent choices of the energy-efficient appliance, so that ∂PA/∂N < 0 (stimuli hypothesis).
Third, we expect consumers to express a willingness-to-pay for better efficiency classes, that
is, τ(S, N) > 0. As this hypothesis is consistent with the idea that consumers employ simpli-
fying decision rules based on efficiency classes, we refer to it as the heuristics hypothesis.
Fourth, the salience of operating cost S and the number of competing stimuli N can work
through two channels: they can influence both the attention to operating cost θ and the val-
uation of efficiency class differences τ. We expect that the two channels work in opposite di-
rections (ambiguity hypothesis). Following DellaVigna (2009), we presume that the attention to
operating cost θ increases in its salience, ∂θ/∂S > 0, and decreases in the number of competing
stimuli, ∂θ/∂N < 0. In contrast, we expect the valuation of efficiency class differences τ to de-
crease in the salience of operating cost, ∂τ/∂S < 0, which corresponds to a substitution effect
between coarse information from efficiency classes and energy cost information, as suggested
by Houde (2014a). Finally, we anticipate that consumers rely more strongly on simplifying
decision heuristics based on efficiency classes in a cognitively demanding environment with
3In the presence of unobserved idiosyncratic preferences for either alternative, captured by the random error
terms eA and eB, the probability to choose alternative A is defined as PA = P (∆PPVC + ∆e > 0), where ∆e =
eA − eB.
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more competing stimuli, so that ∂τ/∂N > 0.
4. Experimental Design
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a discrete-choice experiment with randomized in-
formation treatments. Participants repeatedly chose between two refrigerators that differ in
their purchasing price and energy use. Households were randomly assigned into one of three
groups. In the Control Condition (C), participants received information on the appliances
based on a simplified EU label that displays annual electricity use and the EU energy efficiency
class (bottom panel of Table 1).
In the Operating Cost Condition (OC), the label additionally displays annual operating en-
ergy cost, calculated based on the average electricity price in Germany. In the Competing
Stimuli Condition (CS), participants face the simplified version of the label, complemented by
all remaining non-energy related attributes of the original EU label (information on the capac-
ity of the fresh food and the frozen food compartment, as well as the noise level) and a picture
of the refrigerator. As the only purpose of this treatment is to increase the number of com-
peting stimuli, the levels of the additional attributes vary only by minimal increments (upper
panel of Table 1).4 For example, compartment sizes differ only by about 1 liter and the pictures
depict the same refrigerator model with different food contents (Appendix A.2). We assign the
attribute levels randomly to alternatives A and B in all choice sets.
We implement four binary choice sets that allow to estimate the causal effects of the infor-
mation treatments with a minimum of distributional assumptions (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
The first two choice sets (M1 and M2) correspond to typical market choice situations between
refrigerators. In line with market prices and refrigerator characteristics that we collected from
product data sheets of two large German retailers, we let participants trade off annual energy
savings of either 40 or 60 kWh against appliance price increases of 70 EUR (Table 1).5 Both
choice sets reflect that more energy-efficient appliances typically fall into a better efficiency
class.
4The rationale of introducing some variation in the additional attributes is to induce the cognitive effort of con-
sidering them as additional stimuli. Because we do not intend to influence consumers’ appliance valuations,
the differences we introduce are particularly small.
5To construct realistic choice sets, we used the product data sheets that we collected from the two large German
retailers Media Markt and Saturn. Comparing appliances of a given brand, the median electricity use difference
is 45 kWh per year and the interquartile range is from 35 to 53 kWh. The median purchasing price difference
amounts to 60 EUR with an interquartile range from 20 to 200 EUR.
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To investigate the channels through which the information treatments operate, we construct
two stylized choice sets (S1 and S2) that cannot be observed in practice. Choice set S1 aims at
identifying the value of efficiency class differences by taking advantage of the EEI cutoff values
that determine efficiency classes. We set the annual electricity use of the alternatives A and B
closely around the cutoff value that separates the efficiency classes A+ and A++, differing
only by one kWh, so that the difference of the present value of operating cost is negligible
(∆PVO ≈ 0). Fixing the difference in purchasing prices at 30 Euro, this choice set allows us to
investigate whether individuals have a non-negligible willingness-to-pay for efficiency class
differences. 6 In choice set S2, participants trade off a 70 EUR difference in purchasing prices
against a reduction in annual electricity use of 40 kWh. While these differences are identical
to choice set M1, we determine the levels of electricity use such that there is no difference in
efficiency classes (∆EC = 0).
We test our hypotheses described in the previous section using combinations of the choice
sets and experimental conditions, as illustrated in Table 2. Using choice sets M1 and M2
that mimic typical market trade-offs between purchasing prices and energy efficiency, we test
whether the Operating Cost Condition increases the probability of choosing the more energy-
efficient appliance (cost hypothesis) and whether the Competing Stimuli Condition decreases
this probability (stimuli hypotheses).
To investigate whether consumers value better efficiency classes per se (heuristics hypothesis),
we employ choice set S1 that allows to identify the percentage of consumers who are willing
to pay at least 30 EUR for an appliance with a better efficiency class, even though the energy
use difference is negligible.
The combination of choice sets S1 and S2 with the information treatments serves to investi-
gate the ambiguity hypothesis. Because this hypothesis is formulated in terms of unobservables,
such as the attention to operating cost θ(S, N) and the valuation of efficiency class differences
τ(S, N), it is not directly testable. However, when the difference in the present value of op-
erating cost is negligible (choice set S1), changes in the probability to choose alternative A in
response to the information treatments are directly linked to changes in the valuation of ef-
ficiency class differences. Similarly, in the absence of efficiency class differences (choice set
S2), any impact of the information treatments on choice probabilities reflects changes in the
6Even when assuming a discount rate of 0%, the present value of saving one kWh per year corresponds to only
4.1 EUR (given a constant electricity price of 29 cent/kWh and an appliance lifetime of 14 years).
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Table 2: Overview of Experimental Variation Used to Test Hypotheses
Hypothesis Choice Sets Source of Variation
Cost M1 and M2 Operating Cost Condition (increases salience S of operating cost)
Stimuli M1 and M2 Competing Stimuli Condition (increases number of stimuli N)
Heuristics S1 Choice set where the efficiency class differs, but energy use is almost the same
Ambiguity S1 and S2 Operating Cost and Competing Stimuli Condition in choice sets where:
• Efficiency classes differ, but energy use is almost the same (S1)
• Energy use differs, but the efficiency class is the same (S2)
attention to operating cost. Thus, the analysis of the choice sets S1 and S2 allows to infer the
effect of the information treatments on both θ(S, N) and τ(S, N) by investigating their effect
on observable choice probabilities.
5. Data
We conducted the discrete-choice experiment using the household panel of the survey insti-
tute forsa. Participants are household heads, defined as the individuals responsible for finan-
cial decisions at the household level. We randomly assigned participants into one of the three
experimental conditions and exposed them to all four choice sets. To avoid ordering effects
(Carlsson et al., 2012; Day et al., 2012), the sequence of choice sets and the presentation of an
appliance as alternative A or B is randomly determined.
Data was collected by forsa via a survey tool that allows participants to complete the ques-
tionnaire at home via the internet or television. Respondents can interrupt and continue the
survey at any time. At the outset of the survey, we introduced the experiment (details are given
in Appendix A.3) and informed households about the meaning of the label attributes in their
experimental group. The survey took place between March 3 and April 28, 2015, and com-
prised 5,069 household heads. In total, 270 of them did not complete it, which corresponds to
a dropout rate of 5.3%. As illustrated by Table A1 in Appendix A.4, the socio-economic charac-
teristics of our sample closely match the characteristics of the population of German household
heads.
The descriptive statistics provided in Table 3 illustrate that the percentage of women in our
sample amounts to 33%, which can be traced back to our decision to ask household heads
to participate in the survey. About one fifth of our respondents graduated from college. Pro-
environmental attitudes, proxied by the statement to be in favor of voting for Germany’s green
party, are reported for about 8% of the respondents. Furthermore, we create a high income
11
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Explanation All Control OC CS
Age Age of respondent 55.25 54.87 55.49 55.39
(1.77) (1.31)
Female Dummy: 1 if respondent is female 0.333 0.322 0.325 0.352
(0.04) (3.50)
College degree Dummy: 1 if respondent graduated from college 0.212 0.217 0.202 0.217
(1.03) (0.00)
High income Dummy: 1 if monthly net household income isabove e 4,700
0.118 0.104 0.128 0.121
(3.71) (1.90)
Pro-environmental
attitudes
Dummy: 1 if respondent tends to vote for the
green party
0.083 0.074 0.082 0.092
(0.70) (3.40)
Uninformed Dummy: 1 if respondent states to have no idea ofthe average electricity price in Germany
0.296 0.297 0.289 0.302
(0.22) (0.11)
Percentage of respondents that did not finalize
the survey
0.053 0.056 0.053 0.050
(0.14) (0.58)
Note: χ2-statistics for mean differences between participants in the Control and the Operating Cost (OC) or the
Competing Stimuli (CS) Condition are in parentheses. There are no statistically significant differences in means
at the 5% level.
dummy variable that equals unity for some 12% of participants with monthly net household
incomes above 4,700 e. The dummy variable unin f ormed captures whether consumers re-
port not knowing the average electricity price in Germany, which is the case for about 30% of
participants.
Columns 4 to 6 of Table 3 show that covariate means are very similar across experimental
conditions, as expected from randomization. When conducting χ2-tests for mean differences,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference for any of the covariates at the 5% level.
As the last row of Table 3 illustrates, dropout rates do not vary by experimental condition so
that selection bias due to sample attrition does not seem to be of importance.
6. Results
The upper right panel of Table 1 summarizes the percentage of respondents who choose
the more energy-efficient appliance for all choice sets and experimental conditions. In the
following, we discuss the implications of participants’ responses for our hypotheses.
6.1. Heuristics Hypothesis
We start by investigating the role of efficiency classes, which constitute the defining element
of the EU energy label. To test the heuristics hypothesis, we analyze choice set S1 and deter-
mine the percentage of individuals that opt for the better efficiency class by regressing our
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dependent variable of choosing alternative A on a constant. As the left panel in Table 4 illus-
trates, 65% of the individuals are willing to pay at least 30 Euro for the better efficiency class
of alternative A, even though its electricity use is only marginally lower. This percentage is
statistically different from zero at all conventional significance levels and demonstrates that a
majority of individuals value efficiency classes per se, as claimed in the heuristics hypothesis.
Table 4: Analysis of the Heuristics Hypothesis
Dependent variable: Choice of alternative A in choice set S1
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Constant 0.651** (0.007) 0.371** (0.034)
College degree – – -0.045* (0.019)
Uninformed – – 0.050** (0.017)
Pro-environmental attitudes – – 0.026 (0.026)
High income – – -0.003 (0.024)
Female – – 0.089** (0.016)
Age – – 0.004** (0.001)
Number of observations 4,808 4,063
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. **,* denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
Besides indicating the use of decision heuristics, the valuation of efficiency class differences
may also reflect consumers’ desire to signal pro-environmental behavior (Sexton and Sexton,
2014). Furthermore, consumers may succumb to a “halo effect” (Boatwright et al., 2008), hav-
ing the false perception that refrigerators with better efficiency classes have higher non-energy
related product quality.
To shed light on the role of decision heuristics, we investigate response heterogeneity by
estimating the following linear probability model:
Yi = α+ βTxi + ei, (3)
where Yi is a dummy variable that equals unity if individual i chooses the alternative A and
zero otherwise, xi denotes a vector of socio-economic characteristics and e designates an id-
iosyncratic error term.7
If decision heuristics played a role, we would expect that participants with large information
or decision cost are particularly prone to valuing the efficiency class difference by at least 30
EUR. The results from the right panel of Table 4 tend to support this expectation. For example,
the average probability to choose alternative A increases by some 5 percentage points for par-
7When the data generating process is unknown, Angrist and Pischke (2009) advocate for using linear probability
models instead of nonlinear models that require distributional assumptions (such as probit or logit). Appendix
A.5 illustrates that our results are robust to estimating probit or logit models.
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ticipants that are uninformed about electricity prices. In addition, college graduates have a 4.5
percentage points lower probability to choose alternative A.
Pro-environmental attitudes appear to be unimportant for the valuation of efficiency class
differences, which may undermine the explanation that individuals value efficiency classes to
signal pro-environmental behavior. Furthermore, the parameter estimates on gender and age
indicate that significantly more women and older individuals value efficiency class differences
by at least 30 EUR.
6.2. Cost and Stimuli Hypotheses
Next, we analyze the effect of the Operating Cost and Competing Stimuli Condition using
participants’ responses on the choice sets M1 and M2 that reflect typical market trade-offs
between purchasing prices and energy efficiency. Because of randomization, the difference
between sample averages is a consistent estimator for the average treatment effect and can be
estimated by a linear probability model (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Thus, pooling responses
for the choice sets M1 and M2, we estimate the following model:
Yij = α+∑
c
ωcTci + eij, (4)
where Yij is a dummy variable that equals unity if individual i chooses the more energy-
efficient alternative A in choice set j ∈ {M1, M2} and Tci denotes a treatment group dummy
that equals one if individual i is in experimental condition c ∈ {OC, CS} and zero otherwise.
The parameters ωc denote the average treatment effect of treatment c. To account for serial cor-
relation of the error terms in subsequent choices of participants, standard errors are clustered
at the individual level.
As reported in panel (M1 and M2) of Table 5, participants in the Operating Cost Condi-
tion choose the more energy-efficient appliance significantly more often by about 3 percentage
points on average, which confirms the cost hypothesis. Furthermore, our estimates are consis-
tent with the stimuli hypothesis, since participants in the Competing Stimuli Condition choose
the more energy-efficient appliance significantly less often, by 2.2 percentage points on av-
erage. Comparing participants’ responses in the Control and Competing Stimuli Condition
separately for both choice sets M1 and M2 illustrates that the effect of the Competing Stimuli
Condition is mostly driven by the choice set M2 (upper right panel of Table 1). In contrast, the
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Table 5: Analysis of the Cost, Stimuli and Ambiguity Hypothesis
Dependent variable: Choice of alternative A in the choice sets M1 and M2, S1, or S2
Choice Sets (M1 and M2) (S1) (S2)
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Constant 0.863** (0.007) 0.656** (0.012) 0.714** (0.011)
Operating Cost Condition (TOC) 0.029** (0.010) -0.042* (0.017) 0.070** (0.015)
Competing Stimuli Condition (TCS) -0.022* (0.011) 0.025 (0.017) 0.000 (0.016)
Number of observations 9,641 4,804 4,717
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses (for M1 and M2 clustered at the individual level). **,* denote statistical
significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
effect of the Operating Cost Condition is very similar in both choice sets M1 and M2.
6.3. Ambiguity Hypothesis
To investigate the ambiguity hypothesis, we estimate the linear probability model from Equa-
tion (4) separately for the choice sets S1 and S2. First, we analyze responses in choice set S1, in
which alternative A has a better efficiency class, but consumes only marginally less electricity
than alternative B. The results reported in panel (S1) of Table 5 illustrate that the probability to
choose alternative A decreases by some 4 percentage points in the Operating Cost Condition.
This implies that information on operating cost acts as a substitute for the coarse information
incorporated in efficiency classes: some participants change the basis for their decision making
as soon as easily understandable information is additionally provided in the form of operat-
ing cost. As a result, the percentage of participants with a substantial willingness-to-pay for
efficiency class differences decreases. In contrast, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
Competing Stimuli Condition has no effect.
We then consider choice set S2 that allows isolating the impact of the information treatments
on the attention to operating cost. The estimates from panel (S2) of Table 5 demonstrate that
the Operating Cost Condition significantly fosters the uptake of the more energy-efficient ap-
pliance by about 7 percentage points. Since differences in efficiency classes are absent in this
choice set, we can attribute this effect to an increase in consumers’ attention to operating cost
information. Furthermore, the effect of the Competing Stimuli Condition is again not signifi-
cantly different from zero.
To summarize, we find that an increase in the salience of operating cost has two channels of
operation: it increases the attention to operating cost, while reducing the valuation of efficiency
class differences, as claimed in the ambiguity hypothesis. Reflecting these behavioral channels,
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the estimates from the second row of Table 5 illustrate why displaying operating cost on the
label induces more energy-efficient choices in our market choice sets (Panel M1 and M2): the
associated decrease in the valuation of efficiency classes (Panel S1) is more than outweighed
by an increase in the attention to operating cost (Panel S2).
7. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has investigated the impact of energy labels on the choice of energy-using durables.
Drawing on a survey of about 5,000 participants, we conducted a discrete-choice experiment
that is framed as a purchasing decision between refrigerators of different prices and energy
uses. Participants were randomly assigned into three experimental conditions and exposed to
different energy labels. In the control condition, we presented appliances using a simplified
version of the EU energy label that displays the yearly energy use and the energy efficiency
class of the appliance. In the first treatment condition, we increased the salience of operating
cost by adding estimated annual energy cost of the appliance to the label. In the second treat-
ment condition, we presented further non energy-related appliance characteristics that act as
additional stimuli that compete for attention.
Our results show that adding information on operating cost to the label fosters the choice of
energy-efficient appliances, while exposing consumers to additional non energy-related char-
acteristics can impede it. Furthermore, we find that two out of three participants value a better
efficiency class by at least 30 EUR, even when it is only associated with marginal improvements
in energy efficiency. Moreover, we demonstrate that the provision of operating cost informa-
tion works through two opposing channels when efficiency classes are present: it decreases
the valuation of efficiency class differences, while increasing attention to operating cost.
Based on our results, we expect positive total welfare effects from adding information on
operating cost to the current EU energy label. With some 15 million refrigerators and millions
of other appliances being sold annually in the EU, fostering the choice of energy-efficient ap-
pliances by modifying the energy label accordingly promises significant reductions in negative
externalities associated with energy consumption. Moreover, as the provision of operating cost
can be considered a “pure nudge” (Allcott and Taubinsky, 2015), i.e. a behavioral intervention
that informs previously uninformed consumers, but has no further effects, we do not expect
private welfare of consumers to decrease after being better informed.
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Finally, our findings call for particular caution when transferring results on optimal label
design between energy labels with and without efficiency classes. Efficiency classes not only
influence decision making directly, but also interact with other label elements, such as the pro-
vision of operating cost. Therefore, the effects of modifying energy labels can differ depending
on whether efficiency classes are present.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Visualization of Choice Sets
Figure A1: All four Choice Sets in the three Experimental Groups
Choice Set M1
Control Condition
Operating Cost Condition
Competing Stimuli Condition
20
Choice Set M2
Control Condition
Operating Cost Condition
Competing Stimuli Condition
21
Choice Set S1
Control Condition
Operating Cost Condition
Competing Stimuli Condition
22
Choice Set S2
Control Condition
Operating Cost Condition
Competing Stimuli Condition
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A.2. Pictures of Refrigerators
Figure A2: Visualization of the Refrigerators P1-P4 used in the Competing Stimuli Condition
(a) Refrigerator P1 (b) Refrigerator P2
(c) Refrigerator P3 (d) Refrigerator P4
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A.3. Visualization of Screens used in the Experiment
Screen 1: Introduction to the Discrete-Choice Experiment
Text: “Please imagine that you are about to purchase a refrigerator (similar to the one illustrated in the
picture). To your information: the average lifespan of a refrigerator in Germany is about 14 years”.
Screen 2: Description of the Label Shown to the Respondents
Text: “In the following, we would like to ask you to compare two refrigerators. The appliances are
presented on the basis of the EU energy label and differ in the following features:”
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Screen 3: Further Instructions
Text: “We will show you four pairs of refrigerators. Please assume that all appliance characteristics
not mentioned are identical (such as the number of compartments, the brand, etc.). For every pair of
refrigerators, please select the alternative that you would purchase if you had to choose one of the two.”
26
Screen 4-7: Choice between Alternative A and B in the Choice Set M1 in the Control
Condition
Text: “Which of the following alternatives would you choose?”
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A.4. Descriptive Statistics
Table A1: Comparison of our Sample with the Population of German Household Heads
Variable Sample German Household Heads
Age under 25 years 0.007 0.047
Age 25–under 65 years 0.714 0.671
Age 65 years and more 0.279 0.281
Female 0.330 0.354
College degree 0.212 0.191
High income 0.118 0.110
Data for the population of German household heads is drawn from Destatis (2015). This data source asks the main
earner to complete the questionnaire, whereas we ask the household member that usually makes financial decisions
on the household level. Furthermore, the variable high income is top-coded at 4,500 EUR, while in our sample
the upper threshold is at 4,700 EUR.
A.5. Logit and Probit Models
Table A2: Analysis of the Heuristics Hypothesis (Average Marginal Effects)
Dependent variable: Choice of alternative A in choice set S1
Logit Probit
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
College degree -0.044* (0.019) -0.044* (0.019)
Uninformed 0.051** (0.017) 0.050** (0.017)
Pro-environmental attitudes attitude 0.026 (0.026) 0.026 (0.026)
High income -0.004 (0.023) -0.003 (0.023)
Female 0.088** (0.016) 0.088** (0.016)
Age 0.004** (0.001) 0.004** (0.001)
Number of observations 4,063 4,063
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. **,* denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5%level, respectively.
Table A3: Analysis of the Cost, Stimuli, and Ambiguity Hypothesis (Average Marginal Effects)
Dependent variable: Choice of alternative A in the choice sets M1 and M2, S1, or S2
Logit
Choice Sets (M1 and M2) (S1) (S2)
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Operating Cost Condition (TOC) 0.029** (0.010) -0.042* (0.017) 0.070** (0.015)
Competing Stimuli Condition (TCS) -0.022* (0.011) 0.025 (0.017) 0.000 (0.016)
Probit
Operating Cost Condition (TOC) 0.029** (0.010) -0.042* (0.017) 0.070** (0.015)
Competing Stimuli Condition (TCS) -0.022* (0.011) 0.025 (0.017) 0.000 (0.016)
Number of observations 9,641 4,804 4,717
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. **,* denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5%level, respectively.
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